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Introduction
Under the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement, only 19 WTO Members have made
commitments in audiovisual services in their GATS schedule. As illustrated by Table 1, these
commitments are generally of limited scope and magnitude [WTO, 1998]. Among the large
audiovisual producers, only the United States have taken substantial commitments at the
various stages of audiovisual production, distribution, and transmission.
2/ Though much more
limited, the commitments by Hong Kong, Japan and India (the world largest film producer)
have shown the acceptance by large producers with very influential cultures to consider the
issue of liberalization in audiovisual services with an open mind. The rest of the WTO
members, insecure about the ability of their audiovisual industry to face competition and/or
willing to minimize the exposure of their people to foreign influence, have severely limited
access to their markets. This broad coalition was led by the EC, the only large audiovisual
producer in this camp.
If services would follow the same pattern of negotiations than goods, WTO
negotiators would try to get out of such a situation through inter-sectoral trade-offs -- with the
help of the U.S. audiovisual sector lobbying the U.S. government for the opening of maritime
transportation, and of EC water utilities or Canadian lumber firms lobbying for removing EC
or Canadian barriers in audiovisuals. These trade-offs may be a component of WTO
negotiations in services. But, they are unlikely to be a driving force because reciprocity (the
concept behind inter-sectoral trade-offs) has a more limited meaning in services than in
goods. Hence, the chances to include audiovisuals in the coming “Millenium” Round of
negotiations have so far been received by skepticism in WTO circles.
                                                          
1/Patrick A. Messerlin is Professor of economics at Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and
Director of Groupe d’Economie Mondiale. Emmanuel Cocq is Fellow at Groupe d’Economie
Mondiale. Paper prepared for the World Services Congress 1999 on “Services: Generating
Global Growth and Opportunity,” November 1-3, Atlanta, USA. We would like to thank very
much Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques for its support.
2/Table 1 focuses on the major items of the Central Product Classification (CPC) related to
audiovisuals. Items related to inputs (such as actors) are left aside. Moreover, there has been
some disagreements about the accuracy and appropriateness of the Classification. We leave
these points aside (despite their importance for the negotiations per se).2
The paper argues that on contrary, there are good reasons for optimism, and the
initiative about trade and culture launched in Summer 1999 by Canada (which pertains to the
second group of countries described above) is a first, though tenuous, sign of change. This
optimism flows not only from the systemic evolution underlined by Siwek [1999], but also
from ongoing profound economic changes (partly driven by technological changes) in
importing countries, including in the large EC film markets on which the paper focuses. The
European Common Audiovisual Policies or CAPs (the plural is required because the
implementation of the European common audiovisual regulations is mostly left to Member
states) are as highly protective as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). But they
increasingly show the same fatigue symptoms than the CAP, and broadly for the same
reasons. As a result, the coming years may witness a significant erosion of the support to the
CAPs, first among large audiovisual firms, then among regulatory agencies directly in contact
with markets, lastly (as usually) among EC and Member State authorities. After describing
the first manifestations of this erosion, the paper investigates the ways which could both
hasten the process and provide adequate instruments to answer legitimate questions about
culture (which are raised in the U.S. as well as in the EC).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents ongoing and future
technological changes engulfing EC audiovisual firms in a worldwide competition, and
making these firms increasingly conscious that their size is not appropriate -- that they are too
small for the entertainment markets and too big for the “culture” markets. Section 2 shows
that this situation has been largely created by existing CAPs, and it describes the emerging
recognition in Europe that these policies did not provide the expected positive outcomes, but
that they have rather led to unexpected (for their proponents) costly results not only for film
viewers, but also for many audiovisual firms. As a result, when reviewing their own
strategies, EC firms will increasingly ask for EC “unilateral regulatory reforms.”
3/ Section 3
then suggests a method for hastening such EC “unilateral” regulatory reforms and for
preparing WTO discussions on audiovisuals.
1. Audiovisuals in the Millenium Round: “Mission impossible”?
Because of their heavy emotional content, audiovisual services are a good illustration
of the fact that the traditional negotiating instrument for liberalization (reciprocity) is weak to
the point to lead to pessimism if one counts only on it. Fortunately, other forces are at work.
Reciprocity: “Apocalypse Now”
Reciprocity will be of limited use for introducing audiovisuals in the Millenium
Round for several reasons [for detail, see Hoekman and Messerlin, 1999]. It cannot be easily
measured in the services context: negotiators will have little clue for assessing whether
liberalizing audiovisuals will be (or not) worth roughly the same value than trade
                                                          
3/The paper defines “regulatory reforms” as Winston [1993]: de-regulation of economic
conduct (pricing, exit and entry) and re-regulation of social conduct. Social conduct in
audiovisuals means the introduction of better rules for promoting culture than the existing
rules -- a relatively easy goal since current rules did (still do) about nothing for culture.3
liberalization in maritime transport or in water utilities -- hence whether “trading”
liberalization in EC audiovisuals for market access in foreign maritime transport or water
utilities would be a good deal. Negotiators’ lack of information will be put under strong
pressures by increasingly heterogeneous audiovisual firms: for some of them, potential trade-
offs will be an internal matter (for instance, Vivendi in France is a large water utility firm and
own a large audiovisual firm, Canal Plus) whereas other firms operate only in audiovisuals.
Myopic negotiators and powerful but divided lobbies are likely to be a sure recipe for status
quo.
Negotiators’ difficulties do not flow from ethereal considerations about “culture.”
They emerge in the very first steps of negotiators’ usual computations about the value of
concessions.
4/ For instance, reliable data on imports require a definition of the “rules of
origin” which allows a clear distinction between imported and domestic products (services),
and between products (services) imported from different countries. That is not the case in
audiovisuals. Defining a “domestic” film is not a simple matter, and differences in definitions
lead to huge differences in volumes or values. For instance, French authorities have three
alternative definitions (“integrally” French films, “French-initiated” films and “CNC-
supported” films): in the five most recent years (1994-98), the narrower definition (integrals)
leads to an average production of 77 films, and the wider (CNC-supported) to an average of
147 films, a difference of almost the double.
5/ Criteria for classifying a film are so
complicated that they often lead to arbitrary decisions: for instance, the “Fifth Element” has
been considered as an integrally French movie because it has been largely financed by a
French studio, although it has also been funded by an U.S. firm, made in London, in English,
with non-French actors -- all infringements to normal conditions for getting the status of an
integrally French movie. Lastly, reciprocity tends to have a much more limited impact in
services than in goods. In goods, removing a tariff is often enough for changing substantially
pricing behavior, entry and exit. It is not generally the case in services where border
liberalization requires domestic regulatory reforms to provide the expected welfare benefits.
In addition to these general obstacles, two obstacles specific to audiovisuals make
things even more difficult. First, there is a strong link perceived between audiovisuals and
“national culture” in many GATS members, as best illustrated by the EC, Australia or
Canada. Any liberalization of audiovisuals has to take into account this emotional aspect. The
paradox is that the existing regulatory policies which are allegedly supporting domestic
culture tend to harm it profoundly: as shown below, the CAPs induce strongly European film
makers to mimic U.S. film makers -- leading to an accelerated “americanization” of the
                                                          
4/Calculations for reciprocity in goods consist in getting the value of concessions received
and granted, both being estimated by the tariff reductions (received and granted) weighted by
the trade (import) value involved.
5/If one limits to traded films, this percentage is higher because many integrally French films
are not exported, whereas many of the “CNC-supported-but-not-integrally-French films” are
co-produced, hence “imported” and “exported.”4
European cultures, as best illustrated by the French case. The problem is that this paradox is
rarely perceived and recognized in Europe -- making particularly hard for launching
regulatory reforms addressing the national culture issue in a sensible and convincing way,
and making particularly easy for vested interests to defend the upholding of existing
protection.
Second, audiovisual producers (film directors, film-makers involved in advertising)
are, by definition, “masters” in public relations. They are able to exert unusually skillful and
powerful pressures on governments, as recently illustrated by the fact that a few European
film-directors have provided the “coup de grâce” to the OECD-based Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI), at a time when it was already clear that audiovisual services were
excluded from the MAI coverage [Henderson, 1999]. As the audiovisual sector is an essential
instrument of the day-to-day relations between the “rulers” and the “people,” government
officials need media professionals on a regular basis who, in turn, ask for protection, creating
obviously quid-pro-quo situations which can be easily hostile to liberalization.
6/
These factors imply that coalitions needed for counterbalancing audiovisual
protectionist lobbies should be larger than in other services. This heavy constraint on
reciprocity leads to skepticism about multilateral negotiations on audiovisuals.
Technological and economic tremors: “The Quantum Project”
7/
However, such a skepticism ignores the extent to which technology is profoundly
changing the audiovisual markets, inducing firms to make drastic revisions of their strategies,
and to ask for unilateral regulatory reforms. As technology progress is perceived first by
firms, it makes more important their rôle in the negotiating process, generating a potential
divorce between the most dynamic firms and governments captured by prejudices and
laggards. What follows reviews quickly these aspects.
As is well known, technical progress in telecoms is generating profound changes in
audiovisuals, and it is far to be over. Digital telecoms and other innovations (including the
possible use of electricity grids for telecom purposes) are likely to be as powerful in
audiovisuals as in telecoms, and reduce the governments’ ability to protect domestic markets.
For instance, the EC quota on foreign movies in TV programmes (40% of all broadcast
movies) will become obsolete when EC TV-viewers will be able to download at a reasonable
cost movies from a satellite dish through Internet (or from terrestrial digital TV in countries
like the EC which allows for free cross-border diffusion between Member states). This
technology makes possible for each broadcaster to fulfill the current EC obligation of
supplying permanently 40% of domestic films (if only by installing audiovisual daubs
produced in large quantities by CAPs), whereas European TV-viewers would only download
                                                          
6/There is a noticeable correlation between French major elections and increases in
audiovisual subsidies.
7/This is the title of a $3 million-40 minutes film made specifically for initial Internet
distribution (in May 2000) by Metafilmics [International Herald Tribune, 25 August 1999,
p.1].5
foreign films supplied by this firm.
These coming technological changes force EC firms willing to survive as world
players to re-assess the contours of the market relevant to them, and to realize that they are
small in “global” markets. Table 2 illustrates this point for 1997 (the last year for which data
are available): the average size among the 23 EC largest firms is half the average size among
the 15 U.S. largest firms. As audiovisuals are among the riskiest economic sectors, size is
also a matter of risk management: Table 2 shows that EC firms are significantly more
specialized in audiovisual activities -- hence more fragile in case of downturns. These
undesirable features appear correlated with CAPs: EC firms tend to be smaller and less
diversified in the EC Member states which enforce the strictest restrictions. Since 1997,
major mergers, acquisitions and alliances have been concluded in the U.S. and in Europe, but
they don’t modify substantially Table 2 results.
This correlation is not accidental. EC protectionist measures have consisted in taxing
and in reinforced or creating monopolies, two sure recipes for inhibiting normal market
growth: the more strictly the CAPs were enforced, the more the markets were severely
segmented and restrained, the smaller the EC firms tended to be. The recent years have
revealed all these contradictions: as EC audiovisual firms tend increasingly to be monopolies,
they have become the target of European competition policies for “abuse of dominant
power,” a paradoxical outcome of the restrictions in place. For instance, the largest French
firm (Canal Plus) has been recently condemned by French competition authorities for
excessive market power in film catalogue. This is because, in accordance to existing
audiovisual regulations, the relevant market as defined by French competition authorities has
been the French-speaking film market, that is, 40% of the French market -- in sum, a small
portion of an already relatively small market by world standards. At the EC level, mergers in
EC audiovisual services represent 2% of the total number of EC mergers, but the ban of such
mergers by the EC Commission amounts to half of all the merger bans decided. In sum, EC
firms are kept smaller that they could be because audiovisual policies are segmenting national
markets.
Being relatively small, unable to grow because of artificial segmentation, and often in
quasi-monopoly (rent-creating) situations, EC audiovisual firms have been interesting firms
to buy. Most of them have become part of firms owning and operating other activities (rarely
cultural activities): press and publishing (Bertelsmann, Canal Plus-Havas, Fininvest, Kirch),
advertising (Canal Plus-Havas and Fininvest), insurance (Fininvest), telecoms (Bertelsmann)
and utilities (Canal Plus-Vivendi).
This recent integration of EC audiovisual firms in a wider set of activities is essential
because it may change the balance of coalitions supporting the next WTO Round. Being a
profound departure from the traditional European scheme of public monopolies specialized in
audiovisuals, it is likely to influence the debate about culture in two ways. First, it enlarges
the vision about “cultural goods,” fudging the economically sterile (but politically powerful)
debate about trade balances. For instance, the negative EC trade balance in films is a
powerful argument for protection (despite its economic non-sense). A wider vision about6
cultural goods will balance the negative EC trade balance in films by the positive EC trade
balance in books, help to diffuse the pressures on narrow “cultural” protection. Second, EC
firms looking for access to foreign markets for their non-audiovisual activities will be less
hostile to the opening of EC audiovisual markets.
All these powerful forces for changes are at work. Our understanding is that they are
waiting for an initial push in order to appear in broad daylight. The discussion about the fate
of the 10-years cultural exception may offer this opportunity, and the August 1999 Canadian
initiative on trade and culture may be a first step -- leaving the EC as the only large
audiovisual producer which may try to argue that the “audiovisual/cultural” exception is for
ever (despite the use of the term “indefinite” in its schedule which is quite consistent with the
10 years deadline). Of course, there is always the possibility that exceptions could be
followed by waivers, and that waivers will be traded. Possible “negative” trade-offs (such as
trading protection in maritime cabotage for protection in audiovisuals) may well fit
negotiators’ tactics captured by vested interests. But, they may not necessarily fit the interests
of the EC audiovisual firms facing technological challenges and/or owned by firms interested
in WTO deals in other services.
2. Audiovisuals in the EC: “Titanic”
There is a slowly increasing sense of dissatisfaction in Europe with the CAPs which
have been developed during the late 1970s and early 1980s in certain Member states (most
notably, in France and Germany) and then “communitarized” with the Television Without
Frontiers (TWF) Directive adopted in 1989. Today, more voices recognize that quotas are
useless, a position still taboo a few years ago.
8/ Although the same conclusion is not yet
reached for subsidies (still almost unanimously praised in EC audiovisual industry) the CAPs
are perceived as less protective as it was initially expected, and as having negative effects,
including for film firms.
The section provides a brief survey of these effects. Though it draws many examples
from the French case, it is important to stress that most of the EC Member states (including
“free trade minded” countries, such as Britain) have adopted (or kept) measures in
audiovisuals relatively similar to the French policy [Stetser, 1996].
9/ For instance, as shown
by Table 3, the shares of U.S. and domestic films in British and French theaters may seem
quite different in the mid-1990s. But U.S. films market shares in Britain (1997) and in France
(1998) are similar, and, as a corollary, the same can be said for the market shares for
domestic films (see Table 5). Table 3 also shows that the shares of U.S. fiction (TV) works
are almost identical in Britain and France.
10/
                                                          
8/However, the debate about the new audiovisual law in France has revealed opponents to the
current pattern of distributing these subsidies between beneficiaries.
9/More details about French specifics can be found in Messerlin [1997] and Cocq [1999].
10/One could argue that nevertheless, the resulting level of protection is different because in
Britain, BBC channels broadcast few American movies but BSkyB broadcasts almost7
Quotas: “A bout de souffle”
As i well known, the market share of U.S. films broadcast by EC TV-channels is
restricted in a indirect way. The TWF Directive imposes “broadcast” quotas based on “film”
nationality which are rigidly enforced only in France (and Belgium): at least 40% and 20% of
the total annual number of movies broadcast by every EC TV channel should be,
respectively, “national” (i.e., originated from the Member state in question) and “European”
movies, leaving a maximum share of 40% to non-European (de facto U.S.) movies.
Broadcast quotas are far to be the only quantitative restrictions enforced in EC
audiovisuals, as best illustrated by the French case. There are also “global” quotas which
limit the total number of films to be broadcast and time-specific quotas which prohibit the
broadcasting of films certain days and hours by air-TV channels: both quotas aim at
protecting movie theaters from competition by TV-channels.
11/ There are quotas on
investments which require every TV-channel to invest a share of its resources in film
production, by “pre-purchasing” and/or “co-producing” films: 3% of the net turnover in the
case of air TV-channels, 20% in the Canal Plus case (out of which 9% for French films).
There are arcane rules on programming films in theaters, TV-channels and videos (though
these rules have been recently loosened for unsuccessful films).
The key question is: are all these quotas binding? The answer is likely to be negative
for quotas on the total number of films to be annually broadcast: these quotas have been
substantially increased over time, and they are not so different from the number of broadcast
films in EC Member states which do not enforce such a restriction. But, the answer is positive
to the extent that the structure of the broadcast films by nationality is different from what it
would have been without these quotas. Broadcast quotas on U.S. films are strongly binding
since U.S. films have a market share ranging from 53 to 63% since 1989 (hence, much larger
than 40%) in cinemas where French viewers can make free choices. The same could be said
for investment quotas which contribute to increase production of French films.
What matters is that these protections have not the expected positive impact on French
films. Despite heavy subsidization (see below), there is not enough French films for feeding
the quota of French films during TV prime time. Between 1994 and 1998, there has been, on
average, only 10 French films per year having enough success in theaters (more than 1
million viewers) to be candidates for broadcast during prime time -- compared to an average
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exclusively such films, whereas every French TV channel broadcasts at most 40% of
American movies. As a result, a British viewer equipped with satellite TV has a less-
restricted choice at any time of the day than a French viewer (he can always see an American
movie). But, one could also argue that a French viewer equipped with a VCR buys twice
more blank video-cassettes than its British counterpart -- probably for good reasons easy to
understand.
11/Canal Plus can broadcast 364 movies, whereas air TV channels can only broadcast from
170 to 192 movies per year, depending the channel. Canal Plus is not subject to “global”
quotas: it can broadcast as many films as it wants during “prime time” hours whereas other
air TV channels can broadcast only 104 movies during these hours.8
of 24 U.S. films. As a result, TV-channels have had to have increasingly recourse to massive
reruns of old French films (the rerun rate has increased from less than 60% in the 1980s to
70% in the 1990s) and to TV fiction works -- relegating the recent (subsidized) French films
for feeding the TV late or early hours of the day, and for meeting the annual 40% quota of
French films.
Subsidies: “Men in Black”
Table 4A shows that all EC Member states implement massive subsidy schemes.
However, it deserves two remarks. Relying on 1994 figures, it shows a British exception
which has been eroded since then by the British National Lottery contribution to film
production for roughly ECU 20 million per year -- although the subsidy equivalent of this
fund is smaller because 70% of these funds are effectively reimbursed, implying a subsidy
equivalent of ECU 6-7 million. Table 4A also underestimates substantially the amount of
French subsidies (and of a few other Member states: according to other sources, Italian
subsidies are 25% higher than Table 4A figure). In order to limit problems related to
unaccurate information (and because of the specificity of each Member state subsidy policy),
the rest of the section focuses on French film subsidies (French subsidies granted to TV-
fiction works are ignored).
12/
Table 4B provides a complete information on public direct subsidies granted to
French films for 1975, 1980, 1985, and for all years from 1988 to 1998.
13/ Subsidies have
more than doubled (in constant 1995 French francs) whereas the number of films has
increased by less than 15%. The resulting rate of subsidization (subsidies in percent of film
revenues) is massive. Until the late 1980s, film revenues have been almost exclusively drawn
from their release in theaters: on this base, the subsidy rates range from 16% (1975) to 70%
                                                          
12/The EC-French system is extraordinarily complex: the specialized “guide” of 318 pages
lists 17 broad types of subsidies, only for feature films and excluding regional aids [Fougea,
Kalck and Rogard, 1993]. In a nutshell, French film subsidies can be divided in two major
categories: aids to production and aids to movie theaters (aides à l'exploitation). Among
production subsidies, automatic aids (soutien automatique) and selective aids (avances sur
recettes, or advances on revenues) play a central role. They are granted to film makers
through the CNC agreement, hence the crucial rile of this institution. Though most of the
production subsidies are technically avances, they are de facto pure subsidies. For instance,
reimbursements of such avances granted to film makers between 1985 and 1991 have
reached roughly 12% of the avances, a result provided by two CNC studies [CNC Info, 1984,
August, No.202, page 6, and CNC, 1997].
13/A specificity of French subsidies (see Table 4A) is the large share granted to movie theaters
(exploitation), compared to aids to production. The official rationale for this feature is that
theaters are necessary for showing new films, and generating the targeted cultural diversity.
However, this rationale fits hardly reality: 20% of the French film production never reaches
theaters, and many films are shown a few days. Another rationale for large subsidies to movie
theaters is that 20% of the French movie theaters (representing 50% of the French seats) are
owned by the three French major studios (Gaumont, Pathé and UGC): as little (if any)
monitoring of the exploitation subsidies is done, there are wide opportunities for these three
film producers to shift exploitation subsidies to production or to other uses.9
(1998). Since the early 1990s, movies get additional revenues from releases in TV-channels
and video revenues on which information is imperfect. Assuming these additional revenues
equivalent to 25% of the total revenues earned in the early 1990s [Farchy, 1992], and
extrapolating these estimates until 1998 suggest an average rate of subsidization of roughly
55% in the late-1990s.
However, Table 4B relies on a narrow definition of subsidies -- those granted through
the official channel of CNC. Another source of funds for film production which is equivalent
to public subsidies consists in investment quotas: TV-channels are mandatorily required to
invest in pre-purchasing or co-producing films. In this respect, the case of Canal Plus
deserves particular attention since, with an average spending of ECU 130 million per year
(FFR 800 million) in the late 1990s, Canal Plus alone contributes to two-third of all funds
imposed by investment quotas.
14/ This huge investment requirement has been explicitly
conceived as a counterpart of the monopoly granted to Canal Plus for broadcasting films in
Hertzian pay-TV. The monopoly rent that Canal Plus can extract from its French TV-viewers
can be estimated to ECU 300 million per year (FFR 2 billion) in the 1990s. In other words,
almost half of Canal Plus monopoly rents is a way of taxing French TV-viewers in order to
subsidize French film producers. Including these indirect subsidies, French total subsidies to
film production amount to ECU 310 million per year, and the rate of subsidization of French
films is close to 100%.
The huge increase of subsidies mirrors not only higher rates of subsidization, but also
the high costs associated to the production of French entertainment films “à la Hollywood.”
This shift was the result of the “Plan Lang” (from Culture Minister Jack Lang) adopted in
1989 which was a mixture of political gesture (French films competing with Hollywood
films) and of business craftiness (big budget films allow large private profits in case of
success -- and otherwise big losses to be absorbed by the French Treasury). This shift has a
crucial corollary: the main goal of French subsidies (and quotas) is to protect “entertainment”
French clone films from Hollywood comparative advantages, not “cultural” films.
A system failing to deliver its promises: “2001, A Space Odyssey”
The efforts to extend to Europe the French (and German) system of subsidies and
quotas have led an unexpected outcome: it has made more apparent the flaws of the used
instruments.
During the early years of the system (the 1980s), the number of films produced was
seen as the sign of success of the French policy: this number remained high in France,
whereas it was declining (sometimes dramatically) in other EC Member states. Of course,
this number was simply mirroring the fact that more French public money was made
available to film-makers and spent by them (not necessarily for the official “cultural”
                                                          
14/A last source of subsidies consists in subsidies paid to factors of production of films. Until
two years ago, the unemployment benefits for actors and other film workers has been
extraordinarily generous (even by French standards), with a budget of ECU 330 million per
year, and extraordinarily standards) and unfair (benefits were proportional to wages and fees).
There have also been subsidies for TV satellites (TDF).10
purpose, as just underlined). As time went and as other EC Member states have been
implementing their own version of the CAPs, their film industry begun to exhibit roughly the
same number of films produced than France (between 80 to 130 films per year, for the largest
Member states) leading to the progressive realization that this indicator is meaningless.
As a result, the focus of attention shifted progressively from supply to demand, that is,
from the number of films produced to the number of theatrical entries (despite the fact that
this indicator is heavily weighted by “entertainment” films). During the late 1980s and early
1990s, this indicator was perceived as the best sign of success of the French-style film policy.
However, as underlined before, this sign is vanishing: Table 5 shows a convergence towards
market shares in all EC Member states speaking worldwide spread languages, including
France.
15/ This evolution has not yet changed the taboo of beneficial subsidies -- but it has
definitively turned down the tone about the benefits to be expected.
What has still not been largely realized is an even more interesting evolution: the
demand for European non-domestic films in each EC Member state (for instance, the demand
of EC non-French films in France) is not only small, but generally declining during the 1990s
-- suggesting that the CAPs constitute a barrier to an integrated EC film market, contrary to
its flaunted objective. This evolution is not so surprising. National subsidies have
mechanically amplified film production, while “fixing” national investments in each Member
state. But they have not created a demand for “European” films (whatever it means) for all
that. Rather, they have been crowding out films from other EC Member states in each
Member state. Ironically, the French film industry has suffered the largest crowding out
effect, whereas the only EC film industry with growing market shares in the EC is the British
industry which has been characterized by a severe cut in subsidies for years (forcing it not to
mimic U.S. films, but to dig in for the British touch) and noticeable investments from U.S.
film industry in the recent years.
The most entrenched belief of the supporters of the CAPs is that such policies
contribute to create a cinema of “quality”(whatever it means). What follows tests this
statement (only for French films) with two, admittedly crude, indicators.
The first indicator assumes that people who can recognize the talents of the French
“culture” roam the film Festivals. If this assumption is correct, the French “share of awards”
in the three major European film Festivals (Berlin, Cannes and Venice) seems a crude, but
acceptable, indicator of the evolution of the quality of French films. This share has
dramatically decreased: from roughly 16% (1981-1985) to 11% (1986-1993) and 6% (1994-
1998) if one includes the Cannes Festival (21%, 10%, and 9%, respectively, if one excludes
Cannes).
The second indicator is based on TV audience. As shown above, French films
produced before the 1980s (hence with little subsidization) show, even nowadays, a much
better capacity to attract viewers during prime time TV hours than the heavily subsidized
                                                          
15/As mentioned in section 1, the arbitrary classification of the Fifth Element as a French film
increases the 1997 French film market share in France by 5%.11
films produced during the 1980s and 1990s, despite the handicap of many reruns. Such a
difference in the capacity to attract TV viewers is not observed for recent U.S. films.
Of course, these results do not constitute a big surprise for economists who see
changes in artistic quality as largely exogenous to public policies, and who are ready to
expect the following negative impact of the instruments used. Broadcast quotas can induce
TV firms to produce more domestic films only (or essentially) for increasing the number of
foreign films to be broadcast, making quality a marginal preoccupation. Subsidies can modify
the trade-off between quantity and quality, by anaesthetizing film makers risk assessment, as
implicitly suggested by the much higher ratio of films to viewers in France compared to U.S.
(there is roughly 1.1 film produced per one million of annual viewers in France, compared to
0.43 in the U.S.).
A system loosing support: “The Bridge on the River Kwai”
Under such circumstances, it is not astonishing that CAPs are loosing support, even in
France when it started first and left for a while the impression that it was working. Loosing
support is exacerbated by the fact that the policy is becoming inconsistent in two major
aspects.
First, since 1997, the Canal Plus monopoly on Hertzian pay-TV is eroded by the
emergence of a TV-satellite competitor (TPS) which is a joint venture of all major French air
TV-channels (public channels and their arch-rival private channel, TF1), France Telecom and
Lyonnaise des Eaux (the utility company, arch-rival of Vivendi). A duopoly in pay-TV is
slowly emerging, though Canal Plus remains dominant with 5.7 millions of subscribers (4.6
for its Herzian activities and 1.1 for its satellite activities) compared to 0.6 millions of
subscribers for TPS. But, the rent-erosion process has started.
Second, in a recent (November 1998) decision, the French TV regulator (Conseil
supérieur de l’audiovisuel, CSA) has decided, in application of the TWF Directive, not to
impose French legal constraints to TV-channels from other EC Member states, but to submit
them only to the EC constraints which are less severe (in particular, the EC regime has no
legal obligation concerning the subsidy regime). As said in the introduction, moves by large
firms are echoed by regulators in direct contact with markets.
3. Regulatory reforms and liberalization
Section 2 leaves little doubt about the fact that EC firms willing to become worldwide
players will be interested in EC unilateral regulatory reforms, as a preparatory step for
multilateral negotiations. In this respect, there is little difference between the CAPs and the
CAP: Blair House has required the 1992 CAP Reform.
Effective rates of assistance: “Four funerals and one wedding”
16/
The existing CAP system is so complicated that one has to reveal the net winners and
the  net loosers -- in trade parlance, the “effective rates of assistance” of the various
                                                          
16/We apologize for the deliberate hijacking of the title: the new title seems much better
appropriate with the many net loosers and the only net winner of the CAPs.12
participants in the film industry. For instance, the French version of the EC system of quotas,
subsidies, monopoly rents (created, then taxed and transferred) involves at least six different
participants: theater-owners, film producers (foreign, French successful, and French
unsuccessful), TV-channels and French consumers.
Theater-owners face the annual quota on the total number of films to be broadcast
which tends to increase demand for theater seats, the 11% seat tax which tends to reduce this
demand, and they receive subsidies which may increase it. As underlined above, the effect of
global quotas is likely to have been small, the seat tax impact is substantial, and it is not clear
to which extent theater-owners benefit really from subsidies which can be easily passed to
film production to a large extent.
Foreign-U.S. film makers face the seat tax which reduces the demand of their films,
recoup a portion of this tax to the extent that they are the main beneficiaries of the good shape
of theaters in France, and they face the indirect 40% broadcast quota on U.S. films. As
underlined above, the quota is severely binding: one-third of the U.S. films which would have
been broadcast in the absence of quotas are not. On the other hand, U.S. films which are
effectively broadcast can get rents, but with a negative twist: the “best” U.S. films are not
likely to numerous enough to be bound by the quota (hence to get rents); by contrast, rents
are more likely to accrue to the “good” U.S. films for which the demand is really constrained
by the existing quota. In other words, the quota system works against quality (as for the
French films, as shown below).
Foreign-EC film makers face the same situation than U.S. film producers, with two
key differences: they have access to French subsidies, and they are unlikely to benefit from
possible rents associated to the quota on EC films (their demand by French TV-viewers is
limited).
Successful French film producers share many features with EC film makers, and they
get even more subsidies. It seems unlikely that successful French films receive rents from the
40% quota on domestic films: as said above, they are in too short supply for feeding the
quota.
Unsuccessful French movies are unambiguously among the net winners: they are not
hurt by the seat tax (nobody wants to see them) and they are fully subsidized. The larger their
budgets are, the larger the pure transfers are: in other words, large-budget unsuccessful
French clones of Hollywood films get the best of the EC-French system.
TV-channels are the last major participant on the supply side. Air TV-channels are
likely to be net loosers: they are taxed by investment quotas (and by a special tax of 5.5% on
their advertising resources in case of private TVs, or on license fee resources in case of public
TV-channels). These investment quotas provide some benefits under the form of more
flexibility in TV programming, but they are small, compared to the costs mentioned. Canal
Plus is a special case: it enjoys huge monopoly rents, but half of them disappear in
investment quotas. The erosion of these rents with the emergence of TPS will deteriorate
Canal Plus net winner situation -- becoming a net looser seems a matter of time.
Of course, the viewers of French films (and French tax-payers) are unambiguously net13
loosers: they are taxed, directly (when funding subsidies) or indirectly (when going to movie
theaters and/or when subscribing to Canal Plus); French viewers looking after entertainment
are hurt by restrictions on U.S. films, whereas French viewers interested in “cultural” films
are hurt by the marginal support in terms of subsidies.
This global picture leads to an essential question: a majority of participants on the
supply side are likely to be or become net loosers -- making them more friendly to unilateral
regulatory reforms of EC audiovisual markets and to multilateral negotiations going in the
same direction.
Liberalization as a support of domestic regulatory reforms
What does this presentation of the effective rates of assistance -- and its corollary
policy of netting out quotas, taxes and subsidies -- tell for the coming WTO round of
negotiations?
The first lesson is that broadcast quotas should be eliminated. In the importing
country, these quotas hurt every participant on the market (supply and demand), except the
producers of domestic bad films or TV works. If they will be less and less protective because
of new techniques, counting on time for getting the full impact of technological changes
would simply make the industry recovery more difficult. Moreover, as quotas generate
monopolies and inefficiencies (two strong forces for price hikes and/or quantity contractions),
they “call for” subsidies just in order to be more endurable by the domestic industry itself in
the long run.
The second lesson is that the policy frequently suggested nowadays in Europe
(eliminate quotas, but keep subsidies) is insufficient. However, going further requires
pragmatism, that is, to make a distinction between “industrial” and “cultural” subsidies in
audiovisuals. The above description of the EC regime has amply shown that issues at stake
are not cultural. The same observation can be done with the emerging dispute between
Canada and the U.S. about the runaway film production from American to Canadian studios:
it involves “the small business that support the film industry,” such as “caterers, rental
equipment business, electricians, etc,” not the actors, the script writers, etc. [Statement of
U.S. Rep. J. Weller, August 5, 1999].
As underlined by Siwek [1999], “industrial” subsidies are not acceptable. At a first
glance, this proposition has little chance to fly in Europe. But again, changes are emerging.
The slowly eroding monopoly rents (such as for Canal Plus) is undermining a substantial
source of subsidies, hence the firms’ strategies. The evolution of market shares in European
film markets force regulators to increasingly recognize that subsidies generate barriers, rather
than the Single European Market. Lastly, banning industrial subsidies echoes recent
Commission’s decisions about Member state subsidies granted to their domestic “studios”.
The principle of banning industrial subsidies leads to the problem of their definition, and the
time framework for implementing the prohibition: pragmatism should take the lead, as it has
been done in agriculture, with an immediate focus on export subsidies, and a more
progressive phasing out of amber box subsidies).
“Cultural” subsidies should be excluded from the WTO scope and disciplines. They14
are small today (a point which should be made better known) and they are likely to remain
small. Their existence raise two issues. First, at the multilateral level, they should not become
a way to circumvent disciplines on “industrial” subsidies. An option would be to notify and
monitor them at the multilateral level: WTO Member states should report, on an annual basis,
on the magnitude of these subsidies, the sources of financing, the instruments used (direct
subsidies or tax reductions) and other key conditions, etc. Notifying subsidies at the
multilateral level is often a lip service: in this case, on the contrary, one could expect some
competition between WTO Members eager to show their support for culture.
Second, cultural subsidies raise many domestic issues, the most important being the
following one: to what extent democratic authorities (and associated bureaucracies) can play
the role of a patron?
17/ Being a patron requires to take risks, and to pay for them. Democratic
public authorities are necessarily reluctant to take risks: they could be accused of
“favoritism.” And they never pay for their errors: the tax-payers do. In these conditions, it is
hard to see how such authorities can really promote culture (except in the narrow sense of
keeping in good shape the physical heritage of old buildings, paintings, or films). As a result,
a serious treatment of culture in the film industry (as well as in other arts) requires adequate
regulations for art foundations and for innovative structures for patronage (as aimed by the
British system of “franchised units”) -- all institutions which could behave quite easily
according to the principle of non-discrimination.
                                                          
17/Also of importance is the issue of the source of subsidies. On the one hand, a general tax
system is better than a seat tax (a proxy for general tax being the British case of National
Lottery which may be felt as superior to public budget by film-makers, because easier to
trace). On the other hand, a seat tax is equivalent to tariffs, hence easily negotiable in
successive Rounds of trade negotiations.15
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Table 1. Summary of specific commitments in audiovisual services under the Uruguay Round
Film & Video Film Radio & TV Radio & TV Sound Other
Countries production projection services transmission recording Total
& distribution services services
CPC: CPC: CPC: CPC: CPC: CPC:
96112, 3 96121, 2 96131, 2, 3 75241, 2 96114
Large producers (by decreasing number of films produced)
India X 1
U S A XXXXXX6
Hong Kong X X X 3
Japan X X X 3
Smaller producers
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  R e p . XXXXXX6
Dominican Rep. X X 2
El Salvador X X 2
G a m b i a XXXX 4
Israel X 1
Kenya X X 2
Korea X X 2
L e s o t h o XXXX 4
Malaysia X X 2
Mexico X X 2
N e w  Z e a l a n d XXXX X5
Nicaragua X X 2
P a n a m a XXX X 4
Singapore X X 2
Thailand X X 2
T o t a l 1 7 1 0 7876 5 5
Source: WTO, Audiovisual services, Table 9, S/C/W/40, 1998.17
Table 2. Comparisons of leading U.S. and European audiovisual firms, 1997
Audiovisual Total Audiovisual Growth Audiovisual Net results Net results Audiovisual
Country turnover turnover turnover rate in audio. in total in % of turnover per
Millions USD Millions USD Millions USD turnover (%) turnover (%) Millions USD turnover inhabitant
1996 1997 1997 1997/1996 1997 1997 1997 1997
The 23 European firms among the 50 leading world firms
Austria   (1 firm) 942 818 818 -13,2 100,0 26,5 3,2 101,0
Britain   (7 firms) 14927 27081 17170 15,0 63,4 1504,3 8,8 293,5
France   (4 firms) 6085 5896 5602 -7,9 95,0 353,1 6,3 96,4
Germany   (7 firms) [a] 19177 27872 18904 -1,4 67,8 1169,8 6,2 230,8
Italy   (2 firms) 5049 4855 4855 -3,8 100,0 476,8 9,8 84,9
Luxembourg   (1 firm) 2683 3189 2910 8,5 91,3 -80,6 -2,8 [b]
Netherlands   (1 firm) [c] 5628 5686 5686 1,0 100,0 403,3 7,1 277,4
All 54491 75397 55945 2,7 74,2 3853,2 6,9 196,6
All in 1996 (23 firms) 53356 72890 54269 1,7 74,5 3234,9 6,0 190,7
The 15 U.S. firms among the 50 leading world firms
All 64557 230583 73491 13,8 31,9 14009,4 19,1 279,4
All in 1996 (13 firms) 49055 95365 63416 29,3 66,5 4653,2 7,3 241,1
Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 1999, p.69
Notes: [a] Net results are not available for Kirch, RTL et SAT1. [b] not significant. [c] including Belgian flemish-speaking population.18
Table 3. EC audiovisual markets: cinemas, TV channels and videos, 1996-97
US films EC films US films US fiction VCR Blank
works penetration cassettes
rate [c] [d]
1994-97 1997 1996 1996 1997 1997
Austria -- 0,0 64,6 26,6 75,3 4,7
Belgium 71,9 0,1 34,1 31,1 68,4 4,1
Britain 80,5 4,8 [e] 75,3 19,8 83,0 3,1
Denmark 70,2 0,2 65,6 27,4 79,0 5,0
Finland 72,7 0,1 67,0 14,8 72,2 4,4
France 55,7 10,2 36,2 18,9 77,5 6,3
Germany 78,6 3,7 65,2 35,5 77,3 3,4
Greece -- 0,0 --  20,2 55,7 1,5
Ireland -- 0,0 --  27,1 72,7 2,1
Italy 59,9 2,2 61,6 23,6 59,2 2,3
Netherland 86,6 0,2 72,4 22,7 67,3 4,0
Portugal 80,8 0,1 -- 19,0 52,0 1,3
Spain 72,7 1,9 69,0 28,1 72,1 1,9
Sweden 67,2 0,4 -- 29,7 79,2 4,9
EC-15  [f] 72,4 1,7 61,1 24,6 73,6 3,5
USA 95,4 -- --  --  92,8 -- 
JAP 41,3 -- --  --  90,8 -- 
Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook, 1998 and 1999.
Notes: [a] in % of total entrances.  [b] in % of hours broadcasted (weighted by audience).
Data for US films are available only for 1996 (for comparison sake, data for US fiction works
for the same year are presented.   [c] in % of households.   [d] expenditures in current Ecu
per person.   [e] the share goes up to 8.7% if British-US films are included.   [f] EC-15 simple
averages of the columns are in italics.
Theaters [a] TV-channels [b] Videos19
Table 4A. European Public Support for Film & Video, 1994 Table 4B.  French subsidies, 1970-1997
Total Production Distribution Exploitation Amount of
Mion ECUs % % % Years subsidies
[a] Mion ECUs [a] [b]
Austria 14,9 94,2 5,8 1975 30,6 16,3 16,3
Belgium 8,2 * 96,3 3,7 1980 58,3 25,4 25,4
Britain 1,9 * 100,0 0,0 1985 102,7 35,8 35,8
Denmark 10,5 * 94,2 2,3 3,5
Finland 6,2 85,3 11,7 3,0 1988 110,3 54,8 54,8
France 125,0 * 40,5 6,6 52,9 1989 112,5 63,5 60,5
Germany 76,4 77,5 10,2 12,3 1990 120,3 58,1 52,8
Greece 4,9 91,5 8,5 0,0 1991 125,3 75,8 65,9
Ireland 1,7 * 100,0 0,0 0,0 1992 128,5 63,6 53,0
Italy 74,4 * 42,1 26,3 31,6 1993 143,7 60,6 48,5
Netherlands 9,1 * 98,6 1,4 0,0 1994 164,3 88,2 67,8
Portugal 5,5 86,1 6,2 7,7 1995 172,9 70,8 52,4
Spain 21,7 92,1 2,9 4,9 1996 180,0 65,8 47,0
Sweden 16,3 94,7 3,7 1,6 1997 185,7 69,4 47,9
EC-15 376,6 62,5 10,6 26,9 1998 195,3 79,7 53,1
Others [a] 10,2 67,4 38,3 4,1 1990-97 157,3 70,2 54,3
Source: FIAPF, Films Funds 1994, April 1996. Source: CNC, Bilans annuels. Authors’ calculations.
Note: [a] Possibly underestimated subsidies.
Subsidization rate
(%)20
Table 5. EC audiovisual policies: a barrier to an European film market
Domestic U.S. Britain France Germany Italy Domestic U.S. Britain France Germany Italy
1989 10,0 86,2 -- 0,7 0,4 0,0 34,3 55,5 4,4 -- 0,8 0,8
1990 7,0 88,0 -- 1,0 0,4 0,5 37,5 55,9 1,5 -- 0,3 0,9
1991 5,0 89,0 -- 1,3 0,7 0,2 30,6 58,0 7,2 -- 0,7 0,9
1992 6,8 90,6 -- 1,0 0,1 0,0 35,0 58,2 1,6 -- 0,6 0,8
1993 2,5 94,2 -- 0,7 0,0 0,0 35,1 57,1 2,7 -- 0,3 0,2
1994 8,8 90,2 -- 0,5 0,0 0,0 28,3 60,9 7,0 -- 0,5 0,2
1995 10,5 85,2 -- 0,5 0,0 0,2 35,2 53,9 6,5 -- 1,1 0,1
1996 12,8 81,7 -- 0,5 0,0 0,2 37,5 54,3 5,1 -- 0,4 0,1
1997 28,1 69,3 -- 0,2 0,0 0,0 34,5 52,2 8,9 -- 0,2 0,2
1998p 14,2 83,7 -- 0,2 0,0 0,0 27,4 63,5 4,5 -- 0,2 2,1
1989 16,7 65,7 11,2 4,3 -- 0,5 28,5 57,2 5,0 5,8 1,5 -- 
1990 9,7 83,9 2,9 2,1 -- 0,3 21,7 63,1 1,6 3,8 1,0 -- 
1991 13,6 80,2 1,4 1,9 -- 0,2 21,0 70,0 6,6 4,2 1,0 -- 
1992 9,5 82,8 2,5 2,7 -- 0,2 26,8 58,6 6,1 4,5 0,2 -- 
1993 7,2 87,8 1,1 2,0 -- 0,1 24,4 59,4 4,7 3,4 1,0 -- 
1994 10,1 81,6 4,8 1,5 -- 0,1 17,3 70,0 6,7 3,2 1,8 -- 
1995 6,3 87,1 2,2 1,7 -- 0,1 23,7 61,4 6,4 4,0 0,7 -- 
1996 15,3 75,1 7,0 1,0 -- 0,1 21,1 63,2 5,9 2,5 0,1 -- 
1997 17,3 70,5 8,5 2,9 -- 0,1 24,9 59,7 8,2 2,2 0,4 -- 
1998p 9,5 -- -- -- -- -- 32,9 46,7 --  4,0 -- -- 
1989 1,2 67,4 6,0 3,6 3,6 8,2 7,4 71,4 8,6 3,2 0,9 1,5
1990 2,2 63,5 7,3 11,2 2,6 5,8 10,4 72,5 4,3 2,3 1,1 2,2
1991 2,1 67,8 11,5 6,6 1,0 4,5 10,9 68,7 9,7 5,6 1,2 0,9
1992 2,0 68,4 -- -- -- --  9,3 77,1 3,9 4,0 2,6 1,2
1993 1,0 97,0 -- -- -- --  8,8 75,7 4,1 3,9 1,5 0,4
1994 1,0 95,0 -- -- -- --  7,1 72,3 8,7 3,2 2,3 0,3
1995 -- -- -- -- -- -- 12,2 72,1 7,3 2,9 1,1 0,6
1996 -- -- -- -- -- --  9,3 78,3 5,8 2,7 0,4 1,6
1997 2,0 66,5 4,0 6,0 -- 8,0 13,1 68,2 12,6 2,6 0,7 0,4
1998p -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,9 78,6 --  0,9 -- -- 
Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook, 1999. For 1998, CNC Bilan, 1999.
Italy Germany
Portugal Spain
Market shares of films from: Market shares of films from:
Britain France